



#### Models of Mainstream Public Transport Provision

Presented by: John Preston and Jackie Walters



### Aims

- 1. Determine the critical success factors in contracting-out, with respect to contract design, risk allocation and incentives for both mature and less mature markets.
- 2. Assess how the contracting model could be better designed to maximise technology transfer in the light of big data.
- 3. Examine the potential for collaboration between operators, municipalities, passenger transport authorities, and other bodies.



#### Schedule

#### Workshop 1. Schedule

Monday 26 August					
Workshop session I		Workshop introduction   Overviews			
13:45	John Preston	Introduction to the Workshop			
	Zheng Li	Performance contributors of Bus Rapid Transit systems within the ITDP BRT Standard: an ordered choice approach [1]			
	Qiang Meng	Public bus service contracting: a critical review and future research opportunities [31]			
	lan Wallis	Value for money in procurement of urban bus services competitive tendering versus negotiated contracts: recent New Zealand experience [115]			
15:45	Afternoon tea				
Workshop session II		Bus contracts and incentives			
16:15	Alejandra Chaparro	Application of incentives for Transantiago drivers to achieve an improvement in the quality of service [90]			
	Roger Pyddoke	Penalties as incentives for punctuality and regularity in tendered Swedish public transport [29]			
	Jackie Walters	Understanding bidder behaviour: the case of the Mamelodi contract [13]			
	John Preston	Can bus quality partnerships or contracts make a difference? [57]			
18:00	Close				
Tues	day 27 August				
Workshop session III		Public transport contracting and regulation			
09:00	Niels van Oort	The potential of multimodal concessions for service improvements; three cases from the Netherlands [78]			
	Wijnand Veenema	Developments in public transport governance in the Netherlands; even more recent developments [80]			
	Andrei Dementiev	A theory of regulatory cycles in public transport [136]			
10:30	Morning tea				

Workshop session IV		Railway contracts			
11:00	Christian Desmaris	Regional passenger rail transport efficiency: a test of measurement and explanation in the case of France [88]			
	John Preston	And the beat goes on. The continued trials and tribulations of passenger rail franchising in Great Britain [58]			
12:30	Lunch				
Work	shop session V	Discussion			
13:45	All	Public transport contract design and risk allocation			
15:15	Afternoon tea				
Work	shop session VI	Discussion			
15:45	All	Public transport contract incentives			
17:00	Close				
Wedr	nesday 28 August				
Work	shop session VII	Discussion			
09:00	All	Public transport contracts in the digital age			
10:30	Morning tea				
Work	shop session VIII	Workshop Report			
11:00	All	Workshop report and presentation			
12:30	0 Lunch (end of workshop sessions)				



## **Contract Design**

	Setting up the competition	Contract specification	Contract Award	Contract Review and Enforcement	
Less mature urban market - Unimodal (after Walters)	CfEoI. Briefing. RfP. Clear commitment.	Keep it simple. Small batches. Market development.	Gross costs with unreliability penalties.	Cost escalators. Demand & Supply data.	
Mature urban market - Multimodal (after van Oort et al.)	Sufficient time. Sufficient & accurate data. Funding.	More advanced. Depot scale (100 buses). Environmental specs	Gross costs with quality incentives.		
Mature inter-urban market - Unimodal (after Preston)		Route scale.	Net subsidy with quality incentives.	Cost escalators. Revenue modifiers. Demand & Supply data.	

Development of gold standards (after Li).



### Incentive/Enabler Matrix

	Authority – Managers	Operators – Managers	Operators – Staff	Third Parties	Customers/ Citizens	Complaints data. On rehille surveys. Apps -> Cutizen Sunés Direct demotray Secret shoppes
Pax/Revenue						Accumption two and integrated in certains: - palmage. 1 CSS SEI?
Profit						Adjustments: Cargati ask - by and eyen -
EWT/OTA						Dissuminate but practice re; drivers' mice time - hit.
CSS						and the contract
Complaints						
Adjustment mechanisms						
Capital						
Demand data						
Supply data					5	

#### **Regulatory Cycles**



### Policy Recommendations

- Workforce incentives as an award criteria.
- Availability of (big) demand and revenue data. National standards.
- Consider market dynamics.
- Go gross cost.
- Asset ownership (depots, clean vehicles).
- Capital sharing.
- Integrated incentives.
- Promote partnerships.
- Develop knowledge compendia.



#### **Research Priorities**

- Extend regional railway comparisons from F to D, NL, UK, Russia etc.
- Network design v Contract design.
- Contract design v Risk allocation.
- Optimal package numbers and size (depot, interchange based)
- Ex-post evaluation of incentive schemes.
- Relationship between incentives and KPIs.
- Relative costs of CT and NC (including transactions).
- Mixed contract environments.
- Incorporation of sandbox contracts.

Report back to Thredbo 17.





# Questions? Comments?

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