

# Negotiated vs tendered bus service procurement - recent NZ experience

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# NZ public transport reforms

## ❑ Previous model (1991-2015)


- Based on UK 'deregulation' approach (1985)
- Mix of 'commercial' (25%) and subsidised/tendered (75%)

## ❑ New model (2015 - )

- Public Transport Operating Model (PTOM)
- Urban bus and ferry services
- Goals/objectives:
  - grow patronage
  - reduce subsidies
  - competitive/efficient supplier market
  - 'partnership' approach
- Almost all services contracted with RC

# Procurement and contracting procedures – ‘Holy Grail’??

- ❑ **Procurement approaches:**
  - CT (9 years) – 48% km AKL, 67% WLG
  - NC – ‘L4L’ (12 years – legislated ‘reward’ for commercial services
  - NC – ‘Other’ (6 years) – high CR services, discretionary
  - Allocation CT v NC not random
- ❑ Similar procurement procedures – RfT, tender, evaluation/negotiation
- ❑ CT contracts awarded first, cost rates then benchmarks for NC price negotiations



- Contract conditions (CT, NC):**
- ❑ Identical for all contracts (except duration)
- ❑ Operator provides buses, depots
- ❑ Gross cost basis (+ patronage incentive)
- ❑ Same KPIs, incentives
- ❑ Same partnership provisions – joint business planning, etc

**Holy Grail** (“an elusive object or goal that is sought after for its great significance”)

# Contract costing model –formulation/application

Contract costing model:  $TC = C_H + C_K + C_V$   
 $= (UC_H * hrs) + (UC_K * km) + UC_V * vehicles)$

**Allows for** range of bus size categories (4), out-of-service running


**Calibrate** model to match total CT contract prices (AKL, WLG)

**Apply** calibrated model to each contract to derive contract cost estimates (based on CT calibrated unit rates)

**Derive** (for each contract) ratio actual contract cost: modelled contract cost (based on CT rates)

# Contract cost summary NC vs CT (relative to mean CT cost)

NC: CT cost ratios (averages): AKL = 116%, WLG = 137%



# Comparative costing results – comments

## □ Overview of findings

- CT costs reflect keen competition (5-6 bidders/contract) – reasonable indication of efficient costs
- Cost modelling - NC costs average **16% higher (AKL)** and **37% higher (WLG)** than CT costs

## □ Primary factors ‘driving’ NC cost premium = procurement constraints

- L4L NCs (c.75% of total NC): **RCs had to reach agreement on prices**, but minimal leverage (could not walk away/revert to CT) – major weakness, resulting from legislation/regulations
- ‘Other’ NCs: most negotiated in package with L4L contracts
- All NCs: RCs under time pressure to complete negotiations (for new service introduction)

## □ Other potential factors

- Operator negotiation tactics – CT bids; stone-walling
- CT vs NC choice not random – CT bias towards outer areas (depot sites more available and cheaper) - for NC comparability, CT likely costs +c.5% average
- Cost model may be too simplistic (eg opex inner v outer areas)

# Conclusions

## Have we found the Holy Grail??

**Yes (almost?)** – first opportunity internationally to compare NC and CT costs for a substantial sample of urban bus contracts in closely comparable situations (procurement and contracts)

## But

- Conclusions compelling in this case – primarily results of policy/regulatory deficiency.
- No basis for generalising conclusions to other NC v CT situations
- Successful contract negotiation harder (for authority) than successful CT?
- Key requirements for NC success -- PTO →

# Challenges

## *Negotiated contracts*

- ❑ Appropriate policy/regulatory settings
- ❑ Good cost benchmarking – critical role, comparable contract T&C
- ❑ Clear guidelines for negotiation process
  - documents modelled on CT
  - mediation/arbitration procedures
- ❑ Strong negotiation skills and perspectives – throughout process
- ❑ Realistic 'Plan B' essential
- ❑ Plenty of elapsed time for negotiation process

## *Competitively tendered contracts*

- ❑ Asset availability to potential bidders
  - depots, buses
  - major influence on # bidders, bid pricing and contract prices
- ❑ Sustainability of tender prices
  - provisions to reject too low bids
  - good cost benchmarking
- ❑ Labour arrangements
  - provisions re staff transfer from existing operator, no worse terms and conditions